





Volume 31, Issue 2 
  




Antonio Quesada  
Universitat Rovira i Virgili 
Abstract 
When preferences are defined over two alternatives, the (relative) majority rule is characterized in terms of the four 
axioms U, P, I, and G. U is unanimity. P is the condition that the union of two unconcerned (that is, indifferent) 
groups of individuals creates an unconcerned group. I asserts that the preferences of the individuals of an unconcerned 
group can be cancelled out without altering the result. G states that, for any sufficiently small group G that is not 
unconcerned and for any group H with the same size as G but without members in common with G, it is possible to 
make the union of G and H unconcerned.
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There are several axiomatic characterizations of the (relative) majority rule when 
preferences are defined over two alternatives. Those by May (1952, p. 682), Fishburn 
(1973, p. 58; 1983, p. 33), and Llamazares (2006, p. 319) assume that the set of 
individuals is fixed but their preferences are variable. Xu and Zhong’s (2010, p. 120) 
characterization is formulated for the symmetric case: the set of individuals is variable 
but their preferences are held fixed. Aşan and Sanver (2002, p. 411), Woeginger (2003, 
p. 91; 2005, p. 9), and Miroiu (2004, p. 362) provide characterizations when both the set 
of individuals and their preferences can vary. This paper proposes another two 
characterizations of the majority rule in the latter framework. Though the universal set I 
of individuals is assumed to be finite, the fact that the characterizations hold for 
universal sets of any finite size makes them also hold for any countably infinite set I.  
 
Except the unanimity axiom U, the other four axioms postulated (P, I, G, and SET) 
hinge on the concept of “unconcerned group”, namely, a group whose preference is 
indifference. Axiom P captures the idea that unconcerned groups are persistent: the 
union of two unconcerned groups creates an unconcerned group. Axiom I makes an 
unconcerned group irrelevant when the group joins another group whose members have 
all the same preference. Axiom G establishes conditions that generate unconcerned 
groups: if G is not an unconcerned group but has sufficiently small size, then it is 
possible for any group H without members in common with G, but with the same size as 
G, to make the group G ∪ H unconcerned. Finally, the simple equal treatment condition 
SET by Xu and Zhong (2010, p. 120) asserts that two individuals with strict, opposite 
preferences constitute an unconcerned group. 
 
It is shown that for universal sets of any size, the majority rule is characterized by the 
set of axioms {U, P, I, SET}. When the universal set I consists of just one individual, P, 
I, and SET are obviously redundant. When I consists of two or three members, P is 
redundant. When I has at least four members, none of the four axioms is dispensable. 
Finally, since SET and G are equivalent in the presence of U and I, the majority rule is 
also characterized by the set of axioms {U, P, I, G}.  
 
 
2. Definitions and axioms 
 
Let ℕ designate the set of positive integers and I be any non-empty finite set whose n 
members designate individuals. A group is a non-empty subset of I. There are two 
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alternatives: x and y. A preference over {x, y} is represented by a number from the set 
{−1, 0, 1}. If the number is 1, x is preferred to y; if −1, y is preferred to x; if 0, x is 
indifferent to y. A preference profile for a group G is a function pG : G → {−1, 0, 1} 
assigning a preference over {x, y} to each member of G. For r ∈ {1, … , n}, Pr is the set 
of all preference profiles for groups with exactly r members and P≤r = P1 ∪ … ∪ Pr is 
the set of all preference profiles for groups with at most r members. 
 
For preference profile pG and group H ⊂ G, pH is the restriction of pG to H; that is, the 
preference profile pH such that, for all i ∈ H, pH(i) = pG(i). For preference profile pG and 
i ∈ G, pi abbreviates pG(i). If pG and pH are preference profiles of disjoint groups G and 
H, then (pG, pH) is the preference profile corresponding to the group G ∪ H. Preference 
profile pG is unanimous if there is a ∈ {−1, 0, 1} such that, for all i ∈ G, pi = a. The 
unanimous preference profile for G with common preference a is denoted by (a
G). If G 
= {i}, (a
i) stands for (a
{i}). For any finite set S, ⏐S⏐ is the number of members of S. 
 
Definition 2.1. A social welfare function on P≤n is a mapping f : P≤n → {−1, 0, 1}. 
 
A social welfare function on P≤n transforms preference profiles for any group G having 
n or fewer members into a preference of group G over {x, y}. Specifically, f(pG) = 1 
means that, given the preference profile pG, the group G prefers x to y; f(pG) = −1, that G 
prefers y to x; and f(pG) = 0, that G is indifferent between x and y. 
 
Definition 2.2. The majority rule on P≤n is the social welfare function μ≤n : P≤n → {−1, 
0, 1} on P≤n such that, for all pG ∈ P≤n: (i) if ∑i∈G pi > 0, then μ≤n(pG) = 1; (ii) if ∑i∈G pi 
< 0, then μ≤n(pG) = −1; and (iii) if ∑i∈G pi = 0, then μ≤n(pG) = 0. 
 
U. Unanimity. For each group G ⊆ I and each a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, f(a
G) = a.  
 
Axiom U states that, if all the members in a group G have the same preference, then that 
common preference defines the preference of the group G. 
 
A group G is an unconcerned group, given a social welfare function f and a preference 
profile pG for G, if f(pG) = 0. 
 
IUG. Independence of an unconcerned group. For each pG ∈ P≤n, each group H ⊆ I\G, 
and each pH ∈ P≤n, if f(pH) = 0, then f(pG, pH) = f(pG). 
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Borrowed from Xu and Zhong (2010, p. 120), IUG states that the preference of a group 
G does not depend on the preferences of the members of an unconcerned subgroup of G. 
 
I. Independence of an unconcerned group given unanimous preferences. For each pG ∈ 
P≤n, each group H ⊆ I\G, and each pH ∈ P≤n, if f(pH) = 0 and pG is unanimous, then f(pG, 
pH) = f(pG).  
 
Axiom I is obtained from IUG by requiring pG to be unanimous. According to I, when 
an unconcerned group joins a group with a unanimous preference profile, then the 
preference of the new group is determined by the group with the unanimous preference 
profile. In other words, the preferences of the members of an unconcerned group are 
cancellable if the cancellation of those preferences creates a unanimous preference 
profile. 
 
P. Persistence of unconcerned groups. For each pG ∈ P≤n, each group H ⊆ I\G, and each 
pH ∈ P≤n, if f(pG) = f(pH) = 0, then f(pG, pH) = 0.  
 
Axiom  P holds that the union of two unconcerned, disjoint groups generates an 
unconcerned group. Equivalently, if a group is not unconcerned, then, for every 
partition of the group into two groups, one of them should not be unconcerned. 
 
Remark 2.3. IUG implies both I and P. The conjunction of I and P does not imply IUG. 
 
Whereas I is IUG plus the constraint that pG is unanimous, P is IUG plus the constraint 
that f(pG) = 0. For n ≥ 2, it will be next defined a social welfare function g on P≤n that 
satisfies both I and P, but fails to satisfy IUG. For pG ∈ P≤n, define z(pG) = ⏐{i ∈ G: pi 
= 0}⏐. With P = {pG ∈ P≤n: for some i ∈ G and j ∈ G, pi = 1 and pj = −1}, let g be the 
social welfare function on P≤n such that: (i) for all pG ∈ P≤n\P, g(pG) = μ≤n(pG); and (ii) 
for all pG ∈ P, g(pG) = 1 if z(pG) is even or zero, and g(pG) = −1 if z(pG) is odd. It can be 
easily verified that g(pG) = 0 if and only if, for all i ∈ G, pi = 0. Therefore, if g(pG) = 
g(pH) = 0, with G ∩ H = ∅, then (pG, pH) = (0
G∪H), so g(pG, pH) = 0. This proves that g 
satisfies P. With respect to I, suppose pG is unanimous, g(pH) = 0, and G ∩ H = ∅. This 
means that pH = (0
H) and that, for some a ∈ {−1, 0 , 1}, pG = (a
G). In view of this, (pG, 
pH) ∈ P≤n\P. Consequently, since pG ∈ P≤n\P, g(pG, pH) = μ≤n(pG, pH) = μ≤n(pG) = g(pG). 
IUG does not hold because g(0






which is not the case: g(1
i, −1
j, 0
k) = −1 and g(1
i, −1
j) = 1. 
 
SET. Simple equal treatment. For all i ∈ I and j ∈ I\{i}, f(1
i, −1
j) = 0. 
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Taken from Xu and Zhong (2010, p. 120), SET asserts that, with preferences given by 
the preference profile (1
i, −1
j), {i, j} constitutes an unconcerned group. 
 
G. Genesis of unconcerned groups. For each pG ∈ P≤n such that ⏐G⏐ ≤ n/2 and each 
group H ⊆ I\G such that ⏐H⏐ = ⏐G⏐, if f(pG) ≠ 0, then, for some pH ∈ P≤n, f(pG, pH) = 0. 
 
According to G, unconcerned groups can be generated by duplicating the size of a 
group that is not unconcerned. More specifically, suppose G is not unconcerned: f(pG) ≠ 
0. Then G requires that, for every group H with no member in common with G but with 
the same number of members as G, there is some preference profile pH for H making the 
group G ∪ H unconcerned given the preference profile (pG, pH).  
 
Remark 2.4. U and I make G and SET equivalent. 
 
Assume that f is a social welfare function on P≤n that f satisfies U and I. As G and SET 
are vacuously true for n = 1, let n ≥ 2. To show that G implies SET, choose i ∈ I and j 
∈ I\{i}. By U, f(1
i) = 1. By G, for some a ∈ {−1, 0, 1}, f(1
i, a
j) = 0. If a = 1, then, by U, 
f(1
i, a
j) = 1: contradiction. If a = 0, then, by U, f(a





i) = 1, so f(1
i, a
j) = 1: contradiction. Therefore, a = −1. To show that SET 
implies G, suppose pG ∈ P≤n and H ⊆ I\G are such that f(pG) = a ≠ 0, ⏐G⏐ ≤ n/2, and 
⏐H⏐ = ⏐G⏐. Let pG = (1
J,  −1
K, 0
L), where J  ∪  K  ∪  L = G. By U,  pG  ≠ (0
G). 
Accordingly, J ∪ K ≠ ∅. Consider any bijection β : H → G. Define pH to be such that, 
for all i ∈ H, pi = −pβ(i). For S ∈ {J, K, L}, let S* abbreviate {i ∈ H: for some j ∈ S, β(i) 
= j}. Hence, pH = (−1
J*, 1
K*, 0







L*) = 0. By U, f(0
L, 0





K*). By SET, for all i ∈ J*, f(−1
i, 1
β(i)) = 0. Since β induces a bijection between J and 







K*). The same reasoning can be applied to K and K*, so that, by I, 





β(k)), which is equal to 0 by SET.  
 
Remark 2.5. For all n ∈ ℕ, μ≤n satisfies U, SET, G, and IUG (and a fortiori I and P). 
 
Let n ∈ ℕ. It should not be difficult to verify that μ≤n satisfies U, SET, and IUG. With 
respect to G, suppose μ≤n(pG) ≠ 0, where ⏐G⏐ ≤ n/2. Hence, there is H ⊆ I\G such that 
⏐H⏐ = ⏐G⏐. Consider any bijection β : H → G. Let pH satisfy, for all i ∈ H, pi = −pβ(i). 
Clearly, μ≤n(pG, pH) = 0. 
 




Lemma 3.1. For n ≥ 3, let f be a social welfare function on P≤n. If f = μ≤n on P≤2, then f 
= μ≤n if and only if f satisfies U, P, and I.  
 
Proof. “⇒” Remark 2.5. “⇐” Writing μ instead of μ≤n and taking the fact that f = μ on 
P≤2 as the base case of an induction argument, choose r ∈ {3, … , n} and assume that f 
= μ on P≤r−1. It must be shown that f = μ on Pr. To this end, consider any pG ∈ Pr. Case 
1: μ(pG) = 0. Case 1a: for some i ∈ G, pi = 0. By the induction hypothesis, f(pi) = μ(pi) = 
0. Since μ(pG) = 0, μ(pi) = 0 implies μ(pG\{i}) = 0. By the induction hypothesis, f(pG\{i}) 
= μ(pG\{i}). By P, it follows from f(pi) = f(pG\{i}) = 0 that f(pG) = 0. Case 1b: for all i ∈ G, 
pi ≠ 0. Since μ(pG) = 0 and r ≥ 3, there must be i ∈ I and j ∈ I\{i} such that pi = 1 and pj 
= −1. By the induction hypothesis, f(p{i,j}) = μ(p{i,j}) = 0. In addition, μ(pG) = 0 implies 
μ(pG\{i,j}) = 0. By the induction hypothesis, f(pG\{i,j}) = μ(pG\{i,j}) = 0. By P, f(p{i,j}) = 0 
and f(pG\{i,j}) = 0 imply f(pG) = 0. Case 2: μ(pG) ≠ 0. Letting μ(pG) = a, define M = {i ∈ 
G: pi = −a} and Z = {i ∈ G: pi = 0}. Case 2a: M = ∅. If Z = ∅, by U, f(pG) = a = μ(pG). 
If Z ≠ ∅, by U, f(pZ) = 0. Moreover, {i ∈ G: pi = a} = G\Z. Hence, by I, f(pZ) = 0 
implies f(pG) = f(pG\Z). By U, f(pG\Z) = a, so f(pG) = a = μ(pG). Case 2b: M ≠ ∅. Since 
μ(pG) = a, there is a partition {H, R} of {i ∈ G: pi = a} such that ⏐R⏐ = ⏐M⏐ and H ≠ 
∅. By the induction hypothesis, f(pG\H) = μ(pG\H) = 0. Given that pH unanimous, by I, 
f(pG\H, pH) = f(pH). By U, f(pH) = a. As a result, f(pG) = a = μ(pG). 
 
Lemma 3.2. For n ≥ 2, let f be a social welfare function on P≤n. Then f = μ≤n on P≤2 if 
and only if f satisfies U, I, and SET. 
 
Proof. “⇒” Remark 2.5. “⇐” By U, f = μ≤n on P1. With respect to P2, let (a
i, b
j) ∈ P2. 
Case 1: a = b. By U, f(pi, pj) = a = μ≤n(pi, pj). Case 2: a ≠ b and {a, b} = {1, −1}. By 
SET, f(pi, pj) = 0 = μ≤n(pi, pj). Case 3: a ≠ b and {a, b} ≠ {1, −1}. This means that 0 ∈ 
{a, b}. Without loss of generality, suppose that a = 0, so b ∈ {1, −1}. By U, f(pi) = a = 
0. Since pj is unanimous, by I, f(pi, pj) = f(pj) = b = μ≤n(pi, pj). 
 
Proposition 3.3. For all n ∈ ℕ, a social welfare function f on P≤n satisfies U, P, I, and 
SET if and only if f is the majority rule on P≤n. 
 
Proof. “⇐” Remark 2.5. “⇒” Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2. 
 
Xu and Zhong (2010, p. 120) characterize the majority rule in terms of IUG, SET, SD, 
and WPP when a preference profile is held fixed and different groups can be formed. 
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SD. Self-determination. For each pi ∈ P1, f(pi) = pi. 
 
WPP. Weak Pareto principle. For each group G ⊆ I and each a ∈ {−1, 1}, f(a
G) = a. 
 
The conjunction of SD, WPP, and P implies U. Given that IUG implies P, the majority 
rule is characterized by U,  IUG, and SET. Proposition 3.3 provides another 
characterization of the majority rule for the single preference profile case because, in 
Lemmas 3.1 and 3.2, the proof that f(pG) = μ≤n(pG) only depends on the preference 
profiles pH such that H ⊆ G. By Remark 2.3, Proposition 3.3 refines the characterization 
in terms of U, IUG, and SET by weakening IUG. Remark 3.4 shows that SET need not 
be postulated for all pairs of individuals, as simple equal treatment for groups {i, j}, {j, 
k}, and {k, r} implies simple equal treatment for {i, r} given IUG. 
 

















r) = 0. By IUG, f(1
i, −1







r) = 0. By IUG, f(−1
j, 1











r) = 0, f(1
i, −1
r) = 0.  
 
Remark 3.5. If n ∈ {2, 3}, then P is redundant in Proposition 3.3. 
 
Lemma 3.2 proves the case n = 2. To show that f = μ≤n on P3 if U, I, and SET hold, let 
pG ∈ P3. If, for some i ∈ G, pi = 0, then, by U, f(pi) = 0. By I, f(pG) = f(pG\{i}). By 
Lemma 3.2, f(pG\{i}) = μ≤n(pG\{i}). And since pi = 0, μ≤n(pG\{i}) = μ≤n(pG). If, for all i ∈ G, 
pi ≠ 0, then there are i ∈ G and j ∈ G\{i} such that {pi, pj} = {1, −1}. Let k be the only 
member of G\{i, j}. By SET, f(pi, pj) = 0. By I, f(pG) = f(pG\{i,j}) = f(pk). By U, f(pk) = pk. 
Since {pi, pj} = {1, −1}, μ≤n(pG) = μ≤n(pG\{i,j}) = μ≤n(pk) = pk. Therefore, f(pG) = μ≤n(pG). 
 
The following examples show that no axiom in Proposition 3.3 is redundant when n ≥ 4. 
 
Example 3.6. Let f : P≤n → {−1, 0, 1} satisfy, for all pG ∈ P≤n, f(pG) = 0. Then: (i) f 
satisfies I, P, and SET; (ii) does not satisfy U; and (iii) is not the majority rule on P≤n. 
 
Example 3.7. Let f : P≤n → {−1, 0, 1} satisfy, for all pG ∈ P≤n and a ∈ {1, −1}: (i) if, for 
all i ∈ G, pi = a, then f(pG) = a; and (ii) otherwise, f(pG) = 0. Then: (i) f satisfies U, P, 
and SET; (ii) does not satisfy I; and (iii) is not the majority rule on P≤n. 
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Example 3.8. Let f : P≤n → {−1, 0, 1} be such that, for all pG ∈ P≤n: (i) if ⏐G⏐ ≥ 4 and 
⏐{i ∈ G: pi = 1}⏐ = ⏐{i ∈ G: pi = −1}⏐ = ⏐G⏐/2, then f(pG) = 1; and (ii) otherwise, 
f(pG) = μ≤n(pG). Then: (i) f satisfies U, I, and SET; (ii) does not satisfy P; and (iii) is not 
the majority rule on P≤n. 
 
Example 3.9. With r being any linear ordering on I, let f : P≤n → {−1, 0, 1} be such 
that, for all pG ∈ P≤n: (i) if, for some i ∈ G, pi ≠ 0, then f(pG) coincides with the 
preference of the member i of G such that pi ≠ 0 and no member of G appears before i in 
r; and (ii) otherwise, f(pG) = 0. Then: (i) f satisfies U, I, and P; (ii) does not satisfy SET; 
and (iii) is not the majority rule on P≤n. 
 
Proposition 3.10. For all n ∈ ℕ, a social welfare function f on P≤n satisfies U, P, I, and 
G if and only if f is the majority rule on P≤n. 
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